Copyright 2017 by Melissa Hamilton
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 111

EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE
Melissa Hamilton*
INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2016, police officers in Dallas, Texas killed a gunman
suspected of having just murdered five area police officers and wounded
several others.1 The use of lethal force to end the hours-long standoff
between police and the gunman appeared to be justified in the
circumstances.2 The heavily armed gunman barricaded himself in an
occupied college building, refused to surrender, and threatened to kill more
officers.3 He also claimed to have set bombs nearby.4 Considering the
heinous nature of the crimes that the gunman allegedly committed, the
incident would have been notable even if the police had used a firearm to kill
the gunman. But there were a few unique twists to the case. The police did
not shoot the suspect.5 Instead, they retrofitted a military robot to carry a onepound brick of C4, a plastic explosive.6 Officers operating the robot sent it
into the area to approach the barricaded suspect. Then, after visualizing the
scene through a video feed from the robot and confirming that the robot was
next to the suspect, an officer remotely detonated the bomb. As expected, the
suspected gunman was literally blown up.7 Many commentators immediately
thereafter concentrated on debating various legal and ethical issues
concerning police using a robot to kill in a domestic police situation.8 I seek
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here to address what should be at least an equally pertinent question: is it
constitutionally permissible for police to use a bomb to slaughter a suspected
felon?
Most of the reports about the legality and ethics of the Dallas scene have
not considered this question. The few that have cite legal experts as being
confident in their responses in the affirmative. More specifically, the legal
experts consistently assert that, as a matter of law, so long as a police officer
has a constitutional right to use lethal force on a dangerous felon, then the
means of that force is irrelevant.9 The esteemed Professor Eugene Volokh
agrees, commenting that the deadly force rule “applies just as much to bomb
robots as it does to guns.”10 Even a senior policy analyst with the American
Civil Liberties Union concurs, providing a succinct summary of these legal
experts’ common analysis: “As a legal matter, the choice of weapon in a
decision to use lethal force does not change the constitutional calculus, which
hinges on whether an individual poses an imminent threat to others, and
whether the use of lethal force is reasonable under the circumstances.”11
This Essay challenges this depiction of the current state of
constitutional law. It reviews recent Supreme Court opinions on excessive
force cases and concludes that there is no generalized and singular lethal
force rule in constitutional doctrine. At one point in time, there may have
existed an affirmative, per se rule justifying lethal force.12 Nonetheless,
Supreme Court precedent squarely indicates that such a rule does not now

http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/article_103216.shtml
[https://perma.cc/2HXU-N89J] (arguing that problems arise from the fact that police would be
programming machines designed to minimize harm to maximize harm instead); Hope Reese, Police Use
Robot to Kill for First Time; AI Experts Say It’s No Big Deal but Worry About Future, TECH REPUBLIC
(July 14, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/police-use-robot-to-kill-for-first-time-aiexperts-say-its-no-big-deal-but-worry-about-future/ [https://perma.cc/5BVQ-K8QS] (discussing the
potentially dangerous implications behind autonomous weapons performing unexpected actions).
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7:50 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/it-proper-cops-use-killer-robots-480482 [https://perma.cc/7FUZ4FCH] (asserting that guns and explosives are legally the same in police lethal force cases); Jeff John
Roberts, Why It’s Legal for Police to Kill with a Robot, FORTUNE (July 9, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/07/09/robot-bomb/ [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Ryan
Calo as stating that the bomb raises no new legal issues); Erik Ortiz, Dallas Police Used Robot with Bomb
to
Kill
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(July
8,
2016,
4:26
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dallas-police-ambush/dallas-police-used-robot-bomb-kill-ambushsuspect-mayor-n605896 [https://perma.cc/X9W3-83KL] (quoting Professor Seth Stoughton as doubting
that the “method of delivery” of death is legally relevant).
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11
Id.
12
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stand.13 All police use of force cases are subject to a reasonableness balancing
test. In addition, within that balancing test, the type and quantum of force
used are factors that remain relevant—even for cases involving lethal
force—when assessing whether an officer’s specific actions constitute
excessive force. In other words, American law does indeed recognize the
concept of excessive lethal force. Hence, I contend that an officer’s use of a
gun to shoot a suspect is not synonymous with blowing up a suspect with a
bomb.
This Essay is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of
Supreme Court excessive force jurisprudence and introduces the balancing
test. Part II argues that, under the balancing test, it is possible for police to
use unconstitutionally excessive lethal force. Part III discusses the likely
physical effects of explosives like those used in Dallas and argues that police
use of a bomb can constitute unconstitutional excessive force in certain
circumstances.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE

The orienting constitutional provision used to judge whether police
used excessive force when seizing a person derives from the Fourth
Amendment.14 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”15 It is well settled that police action in apprehending
a suspected criminal by killing him qualifies as a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.16
The primary standard for judging excessive force in Fourth Amendment
cases weighs the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions,
considering the totality of the circumstances.17 The objective nature of the

13

See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (per curiam) (arguing that Garner’s statement
about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently dangerous felon was too general a
comment to qualify as a clearly established rule); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–22 (2014)
(citing Garner only to clarify that the Court considers a number of factors in cases involving deadly
force); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that
triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly force.’”).
14
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16
Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. Interestingly, neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment provide protections in a scenario such as that in Dallas. The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause applies only to prisoners following an adjudication of guilt. See City of
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive Due
Process Clause, which contains a “shocks-the-conscience” test for claims involving seizures, generally
applies to pre-trial detainees, such as those residing in jail. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 849, 854 (1998). This leaves the Fourth Amendment as the sole relevant constitutional
standard for judging the actions taken by police when seizing suspects in the field.
17
Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9.
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test means that the acting officer’s “underlying intent or motivation” is
immaterial.18 The objective reasonableness test requires the court to “balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion.”19
A few of the relevant factors commonly utilized in adjudging the extent
of the government’s interest in using force to seize a person include the
severity of the crime, whether the suspect is a threat to others, and whether
the suspect is physically resisting arrest or fleeing from police.20 Certainly,
police may use greater force to seize suspects who pose a greater threat to
others or those who resist the police.21
Excessive force claims regarding nondeadly police actions to seize a
person have long been particularly concerned with the type and amount of
force used. Courts have devoted a substantial amount of time and text to
analyzing even minor instances of police use of force.22 A significant number
of legal opinions are devoted to judging specific forms of force, such as the
use of batons, handcuffs, hogties, or pepper spray.23 Other opinions focus on
what are sometimes perceived as more intermediate forms of force, such as
police dogs, tasers, beanbag projectiles, or carotid chokeholds.24
Furthermore, judges often do not treat all instances of each of these
forms of force equally. For example, the use of a police baton may or may
not be justified based on how the baton is used and the degree to which a
suspect was cooperating with the police officer.25 Handcuffing a suspect may
be appropriate in many cases of legal arrests, but leaving handcuffs on too
tightly and for too long may become unreasonable.26 These sorts of
judgments on the method and quantum of force for nonlethal force cases are
applied to all of the ways police physically seize suspects.
Legal commentators on the Dallas bombing who endorse the use of any
type of force once lethal force is justified would likely not doubt that the
form and magnitude of force remain relevant in judging the permissibility of
nonlethal force. The commentators seem to believe that when lethal force is
18

Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
20
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
21
Id.
22
See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§ 3.12[D] (4th ed. Supp. 2017) (describing how courts have ruled on varying degrees of severity of police
use of force).
23
Id. at § 3.12[D][1][q].
24
Id. at § 3.12[D][3].
25
Id. at n. 2542.1.4.
26
Id. at § 3.12[D][3][e].
19
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legally justified, some kind of on/off switch is triggered,27 and once triggered,
police may permissibly use any form of force that may be at hand.
However, this view of the law no longer appears to be accurate—if it
ever was in the first instance. A focused review of the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s doctrine on Fourth Amendment excessive force cases
demonstrates that the means and magnitude of the lethal force used are
relevant to ascertaining whether it was excessive considering the
circumstances.
A. Tennessee v. Garner
The notions that there is a single deadly force rule and that deadly force
comprises a monolithic category of force arguably derive some validation
from a Supreme Court opinion issued three decades ago. In Tennessee v.
Garner, the Court overturned the common law rule that it was per se
reasonable for police to use deadly force to stop all fleeing felons.28 The
Garner Court specifically found that it constituted excessive force for an
officer to shoot a small-statured, fleeing burglary suspect in the back of the
head.29
Nonetheless, the Garner Court conjectured that it would be reasonable
to use deadly force to prevent an escape if “the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others.”30 This latter statement is likely the basis for the
contention that Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes a single affirmative
rule triggering the rightful use of lethal force to seize a sufficiently dangerous
felon. Indeed, without further qualifiers, this language in Garner might lead
one to conclude that the form of deadly force is not an issue because the
statement generically refers to “deadly force.” In other parts of the Garner
opinion, the Court likewise seemed to treat death in a unitary fashion. The
opinion confirmed that the “intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly
force is unmatched.”31 Further, a “suspect’s fundamental interest in his own
life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the
interest of the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of guilt
and punishment.”32
On the other hand, the Garner decision—and multiple Supreme Court
decisions that followed it—contain relevant standards and critical
27
28
29
30
31
32

See supra notes 9–11and accompanying text.
471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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observations that suggest that the law does not treat all forms of deadly force
equally. In fact, determining whether the lethal force employed in a
particular situation amounts to excessive force calls for a balancing test that
involves considering the form and quantum of the force used.
B. Balancing Test
Since Garner, the Supreme Court has confirmed that all police use of
force cases, including those clearly involving lethal force, are subject to a
balancing test. In Plumhoff v. Rickard, a police officer fatally shot the driver
of a fleeing vehicle.33 The Court concluded that the force used was reasonable
under the circumstances, and cited Garner only to support applying the
balancing test to cases involving lethal force.34 In Tolan v. Cotton, the police
shot a resisting suspect, causing him life-altering injuries.35 Like Plumhoff,
the Tolan opinion mentioned Garner merely to justify applying the balancing
test.36 In City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, the Court affirmed
the reasonableness of an officer’s decision to use “potentially deadly force”
by shooting the suspect multiple times.37 The Court again did not rely upon
Garner in its decision on this issue, but instead referred to discussions of the
reasonableness test from Plumhoff.38
In light of the Court’s repeated insistence that the balancing test be
applied to all police use of force cases, the remark in Garner seeming to issue
a per se rule that it is reasonable to use lethal force to seize a sufficiently
dangerous felon now appears to be an anomaly. The Court has cited the
purported Garner lethal force “rule” merely one time since Garner, and only
in dicta.39 Rather, the Supreme Court has twice specifically rejected the idea
that Garner established any special doctrine for deadly force. In Scott v.
Harris, the majority reasoned that “Garner did not establish a magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions
constitute ‘deadly force.’”40 Instead, the Scott Court characterized the
relevant comment in Garner as pontificating “about the factors that might
have justified shooting the suspect in that case.”41 The Scott opinion went on
to state that “[w]hether or not [the officer’s] actions constituted application

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
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of ‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [his or her] actions were
reasonable.”42
Similarly, in Mullenix v. Luna, the Court confirmed that Garner’s
statement about the reasonableness of using deadly force on a sufficiently
dangerous felon was too general a comment to be applied to any specific
circumstances or to qualify as a clearly established rule.43 Considering the
Court’s various condemnations of any per se rule, there appears to no longer
be a viable argument that Garner established a particular rule for deadly
force cases that differs from the balancing test discussed above.
Consistent therewith, several lower courts, relying upon the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on applying the balancing test to all excessive force cases,
have expressly recognized that no distinct deadly force rule survived Garner.
These courts construe the Supreme Court rulings in Scott or Plumhoff as
signifying that there is no strict rule that differentiates lethal from nonlethal
force in excessive force cases. The single question is whether the force was
objectively reasonable in the situation.44 As an example, a district court
recently acknowledged that since the reasonableness review is the same
whether or not the force constitutes deadly force, the question is whether the
force used was excessive based on the perspective of a reasonable officer at
the scene.45
In sum, the entrenchment of the balancing test and the Supreme Court’s
departure from any magical on/off switch specifically addressing lethal force
cases means that any supposed per se rule is obsolete. The balancing test also
means that there is no monolithic definition of deadly force. If all types of
lethal force were equal, then there would be no need to consider the nature
and quality of the intrusion.

42

Id. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979)) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test “is not capable of precise definition
or mechanical application” and therefore “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case”).
43
136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015).
44
Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that excessive force claims are
judged under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard); Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962,
968 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the touchstone of the reasonableness inquiry was not the subjective strength of the
officer’s belief, but its grounding in the objective facts”); Peguero v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-5184
(JPO), 2015 WL 1208353, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) (discussing an analysis of the totality of
circumstances under an objective reasonable test); Stauffer v. Simpkins, No. 13-1094, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18751, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) (explaining that a series of Supreme Court cases show that
an objective reasonableness test applies in cases involving deadly force).
45
Lively v. Theriot, No. 6:13-2756, 2015 WL 3952159, at *4 (W.D. La. June 29, 2015).
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II. EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE
Assume for a moment both the existence of a per se rule and the
following factual circumstances: an officer uses deadly force to seize a
fleeing or fighting suspect who poses a threat to the officer or others. Does
that mean that there is no legal concept whereby the means or quantum of
force used could constitute excessive lethal force, and thus be unreasonable
and unconstitutional?
A district court recently discussed whether the means or quantum of
lethal force mattered.46 The Middle District of Tennessee asserted that
Plumhoff “rejected the argument that where deadly force is reasonable, a
police officer can still be liable for using too much deadly force.”47
According to the court, under Plumhoff, if an officer “was justified in using
deadly force, the sheer volume of bullets he used will not provide an
independent avenue to liability, no matter how excessive it may seem.”48
But this reading of Plumhoff is mistaken. The Supreme Court in
Plumhoff qualified the relevant statement as follows: “It stands to reason that,
if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe
threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has
ended.”49 Importantly, the Plumhoff Court further commented that the Fourth
Amendment would have been violated if the officers “had initiated a second
round of shots after an initial round had clearly incapacitated” the suspect or
the suspect “had clearly given himself up.”50
Indeed, the Court in Plumhoff actually entertained the argument that,
even if deadly force was initially permissible, the officers still used too much
force. The Plumhoff opinion first concluded on the merits that it was
reasonable for the officer to shoot at the fleeing felon.51 Next, the opinion
considered the argument that “even if the use of deadly force was
permissible, [the officers] acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots.”52
The Court did not reject this claim out of hand, but analyzed whether the
police fired an inappropriate number of shots, i.e., whether they had used
excessive lethal force.53 The majority ruled that firing fifteen shots was not
unreasonable considering the suspect continued to attempt to flee throughout
46

Smith v. Cumberland Cty., No. 2:14-cv-00049, 2015 WL 7302513, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18,

2015).
47
48
49
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the period the shots were fired.54 The Court likely would not have entertained
the argument about excessive deadly force, or would have summarily
dismissed it, if all forms and quanta of lethal force were legally permissible
once any use of lethal force was justified.
A. Framing the Form and Quantum of Lethal Force
The Supreme Court in many cases has not treated deadly force as some
monolithic category. The Garner Court itself considered the form of force
used to be important. The Garner majority pointed out that “this Court, by
balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has examined the
reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted.”55
Further, the Court noted that, because the balancing test requires an analysis
of the intrusion, “it is plain that reasonableness depends on not only when a
seizure is made, but also how it is carried out.”56 The Garner opinion also
cited precedent whereby “a particular sort of search or seizure” had been
found reasonable or not.57
Later Supreme Court opinions also focus on the form of force used. In
Scott, the Court held that the underlying reasonableness test, whether applied
to cases of deadly force or not, requires weighing “the use of a particular type
of force in a particular situation.”58 Notice the Court’s concern in Garner and
Scott, which both entailed police employing deadly force, with the manner
or type of seizure and how it was carried out. These rather similar statements
in Garner and Scott confirm that both the form and quantum of force remains
a relevant aspect of Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis, regardless
of whether or not the act amounted to “lethal force.”
Indeed, in cases where the officer’s actions endanger human life, the
Supreme Court tends to frame the issue in a way that expressly chronicles
the form and amount of deadly force used. For example, in Brower v. County
of Inyo, the Court addressed a scenario involving police chasing the driver
of a stolen car who led them on a high-speed chase at night.59 To stop the
fleeing driver, the officers in Brower set up a roadblock by parking a tractor
trailer across all lanes and behind a curb in the road, with the truck’s lights
turned off.60 In addition, they placed a patrol car next to the parked truck with
its headlights shining so that an oncoming driver would be blinded and
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (emphasis added).
489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989).
Id.
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unable to see the truck in its path.61 The fleeing suspect promptly rounded
the bend at a fast pace, crashed into the truck, and died.62 The Court in
Brower did not make any conclusions on the reasonableness of this action
(because the issue at hand was whether the roadblock constituted a seizure).63
But the majority did comment that the manner in which the police had set up
the roadblock, particularly the risk and likelihood of death to the suspect,
would be relevant to the question of reasonableness, which it left to the court
of appeals on remand.64
In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court indicated that the issue before it was
whether it was reasonable for an officer “to shoot a disturbed felon, set on
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate
area [were] at risk from that flight.”65 Notice that, in this conceptualization,
the fact that the method of force—a gunshot—was expressly incorporated
into the specific question posed. In Scott, the Court framed the particular
issue as whether it was reasonable to “attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from
continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from
behind.”66 Similarly, in Plumhoff, the Court framed the issue as whether the
officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they “shot the driver of a
fleeing vehicle to put an end to a dangerous car chase.”67 Again, in these
latter two cases the Court fixated on the specific form and amount of lethal
force to end high-speed chases.
Hence, at least four times the Court carefully framed the balancing
inquiry as not about whether any affirmative lethal force rule was triggered.
Instead, it considered the particular form and amount of force used in light
of the circumstances surrounding the police’s interaction with the dangerous
suspects. Additionally, the Court indicated in Scott that Garner could not
provide a controlling precedent where the form of lethal force was different.
According to the Court, “Garner had nothing to do with one car striking
another or even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s bumping a
fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a gun so as to hit
a person.”68 The next Section provides additional support underlying this
Essay’s disagreement with any conceptualization of deadly force as
comprising some discrete classification.
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id. at 594, 598.
64
Id. at 599–600.
65
543 U.S. 194, 199–200 (2004).
66
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2009).
67
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2016–17 (2014).
68
Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting Adams v. St. Lucie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 962 F.2d. 1563, 1577
(11th Cir. 1992) (Edmonson, J., dissenting), vacated 982 F.2d 472 (11th Cir. 1993)).
62
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B. Intrusions upon Bodily Integrity
Courts regularly parse the means and quantum of police force used as a
constitutional matter. The Fourth Amendment requires it. The Amendment
protects one’s privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by
governmental officials. Thus, when an officer’s action involves an assault on
a suspect’s body, the Supreme Court has recognized that a factor in
determining its reasonableness is “the extent of intrusion upon the
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity.”69
This factor signifies again that all forms of lethal force are not synonymous
for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Court relied on this factor in Winston v. Lee to hold that forced
surgery to extract a bullet from the defendant’s chest to be used as evidence
constituted an unreasonably intrusive procedure.70 The Winston Court
distinguished a previous case that sanctioned a forced blood draw to test for
intoxicants based on its conclusion that surgically removing a bullet was far
more intrusive and medically risky than drawing blood.71
The following excerpt from a lower court’s discussion of the effect of
a taser is another example of the relevance of the physical consequences of
a particular form of force:
The incapacitating effects of tasers in dart mode entail unique intrusions into
one’s bodily integrity that increase with prolonged exposure. In addition to the
pain inflicted, tasers in dart mode result in total loss of control over one’s own
body, immobilization caused not by any external overpowering force, such as a
police control hold, but rather by a forced internal separation of the mind and
body.72

C. Lethal Force Is Not a Monolithic Category
Determining whether the specific police action constitutes lethal force
in the first place is likely a red herring. Definitional issues suggest that courts
should not focus on whether the force used was “deadly” force. The Supreme
Court has not clearly defined the term as it is used in Fourth Amendment
seizure law. Lower courts have tended to define deadly force as an action
that carries a “substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”73 Yet this
definition is not helpful in many cases, as determining the exact risk of injury
resulting from police conduct is nearly impossible. In the words of the Court

69
70
71
72
73

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
Id. at 756, 766.
Id. at 761, 763–64.
De Contreras v. City of Rialto, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 2012).
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in Scott, “there is no obvious way to quantify the risks” created by an
officer’s specific action.74
Furthermore, many courts have understandably been unwilling to
strictly classify particular types of weapons as always being deadly or not
deadly.75 The rationale tends to be that any of the tools typically employed
by police can in fact be used in a highly risky manner and that many types
of force may thus result in the suspect’s death.76 Even tools that were
specifically created to render nondeadly force (such as police dogs, tasers, or
projectile weapons) can be used in an unusual way to create a substantial risk
of serious injury or death.77 In contrast, those forms of force that are designed
to pose a high risk of serious injury or death, such as firearms, do not always
result in serious injury or death. Recognizing these points, some courts refer
to methods as “more” or “less” lethal than others.78 The Supreme Court in
Scott, for instance, recognized that using a police car to ram a fleeing
motorist’s car off the road might “pose[] a high likelihood of serious injury
or death” to the motorist, “though not the near certainty of death posed by,
say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head.”79
In sum, labeling the level (e.g., nonlethal, intermediate, lethal) of force
used is not particularly useful. Rather, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurrence in Mullenix v. Luna, defining police use of force as lethal or not
should not be an orienting focus.80 Instead, the relevant question is simply
whether the officer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances, and
that question is to be answered using the balancing test.81 The balancing test
is likely why the Court in Scott opined that other factors might be relevant in
weighing the reasonableness of the officer’s actions in terms of the level of
74
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risk to the suspect. It conjectured that a higher probability of a suspect’s
death may be justifiable if, as in the factual circumstances of Scott, a greater
number of innocent lives were at stake.82 This suggests there is no magical
threshold in terms of the level of risk for an action to constitute deadly force
as a general rule, and that in any case the threshold in terms of the likelihood
of the risk in any particular case may be on a sliding scale considering other
foreseeable consequences.
The concept of excessive lethal force is not one drawn from whole
cloth. Excessive deadly force has been recognized in military situations.83 A
political scientist speaking about killing in wars and times of civil unrest
coined the term “extra-lethal violence,” which she defines as “physical acts
committed face-to-face that transgress shared norms and beliefs about
appropriate treatment of the living as well as the dead.”84 This idea of extralethal violence can assuredly be applied to excessive force cases in a
domestic policing context. Fourth Amendment doctrine can act as a source
of societal norms and beliefs concerning a person’s justifiable interests in his
or her own privacy and bodily integrity.
Societal and judicial disapproval of police use of gratuitous violence
also supports the conclusion that police use of excessive lethal violence can
be unconstitutional. Judges have recognized that force that is unnecessary
and disproportionate may be excessive.85 This conclusion is in line with the
purpose of the balancing test, as excessive force by definition cannot fulfill
any legitimate governmental interest.86
There is an additional ethical cliff. If the assertion was accurate that all
forms of lethal force are synonymous in domestic policing, then police could
use any instrument at their disposal or wreak needless havoc on a suspect’s
mind and body, regardless of how shocking or against popular norms it may
be. Could it really be deemed reasonable for police on the streets to engage
in gratuitously gory forms of killing, choose unnecessary and
disproportionately offensive methods, or use torture? Imagine law
enforcement officers on America’s streets using such primitive methods as
beheading, scalping, stoning, or lynching, or employing biological weapons.
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The idea that some sort of lethal force trigger would automatically permit
any of those nefarious methods offers too much of a slippery slope into even
greater absurdity and carnage. Of relevance, too, is that excessive lethal force
cases involve violence perpetrated against someone who has not been tried
or convicted of any offense.
III. BLAST INJURIES AND EXCESSIVE LETHAL FORCE
As of the time of this writing, Dallas officials had not yet revealed any
information about the condition of the suspect’s body after the explosion.
Still, officials have disclosed the amount and type of explosive material used,
described the site and the position of the suspect preceding the detonation,
and permitted news agencies to tour and photograph the scene afterward
(except for the suspect’s body).87 Together, this information can be used to
deduce the possible effects of the explosion on the suspected gunman’s body.
Dallas police detonated a one-pound block of C4 next to the suspect,
who was at the time up against a wall in a confined area of a college
building.88 C4 is a common type of plastic explosive, typically used in
military settings or in terrorist activities.89 C4 is classified as a high-order
explosive, meaning that its initiation detonates into an explosive shock wave
with blast effects.90 To simplify, after a C4 explosion, positive blast pressure
occurs with expanding gases rolling out in a wave from the point of
detonation at an extreme velocity, creating a path of destruction along its
way.91 The wave then inverts as a negative blast of suction in which a vacuum
of pressure forms toward the point of detonation.92
The effects of a high-order explosive device, such as C4, are magnified
in a confined environment. This means that in a closed space its destructive
impact multiplies beyond that directly caused by the explosive on its own.93
Researchers in a controlled experiment set off a one pound C4 explosive in
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a confined, ten by eight by eight foot rectangular steel bunker.94 The size of
the bomb and the area circumference in the experimental design appear
comparable to the device and enclosed space in which the Dallas bombing
occurred.95 The results of the experiment showed that overpressurization
effects after the initial detonation subsequently caused an implosion in the
center of the space, which then radiated a secondary pressure wave
outwards.96 The shockwaves then reflected off the walls simultaneously and
moved inwards then outwards repeatedly with significant magnitudes of
force.97
Overpressurization can propel nearby human bodies long distances.98 In
confined spaces, the blast may slam bodies into walls, ceilings, or floors.99
The force of a blast wave and its after effects can, depending on the
circumstances, cause multiple external and internal injuries.100 Bomb blasts
are relatively unique in their ability to impose catastrophic, multi-systemic
injuries simultaneously.101 “Blast injury” has been coined to describe the
unique “biophysical and pathophysiological” impacts upon a human body
that occurs when exposed to blast effects.102 Common consequences to a
human near a detonation include traumatic brain injury, blast lung injury, ear
canal and eyeball rupture, bowel perforation, organ laceration, acute renal
failure, ruptured liver or spleen, testicular rupture, blood hemorrhaging,
fracture and traumatic amputation, burns, angina, and sepsis.103
A blast wave can also discharge large objects which may crush a person.
Additionally, fragmentation causes objects within the path of shockwaves to
break apart and become projectiles that can penetrate a body.104 These effects
of blast injury tend to be amplified for bodies near walls.105
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It is very likely that the suspected gunman in Dallas sustained many of
the various types of blast injuries just mentioned. Photographs of the scene
after the bombing show significant structural damage to the building.106
Walls, ceilings, and doors were torn apart, glass was shattered, and other
visual evidence is consistent with a bomb having just exploded.107 This visual
evidence affirms that the suspect likely experienced many of the catastrophic
consequences of over-pressurization and fragmentation mentioned above.
His body surely would have been pummeled internally and externally both
before and after death, likely repeatedly.
The primary purpose of this Essay is to challenge the legal assertion
made by several experts after the Dallas events that the form of lethal force
is irrelevant to its constitutionality. Assuming the veracity of the facts
released to date from police officials, it appears that it was objectively
reasonable for officers to believe that they faced a highly dangerous subject
who had committed heinous acts of violence. There are strong indications
that the officers had good reason to believe at that time that extreme force,
even that which posed a high degree of injury and death to the suspect, was
necessary to protect the safety of other officers and civilians.108 Thus, if a
police sniper had killed the armed suspect with a single bullet, it would
appear to have been objectively reasonable considering the totality of the
circumstances.
Nonetheless, the form and amount of force the police used in Dallas on
July 7—exploding a pound of C4 in a confined space—are relevant to
whether the police acted reasonably. The blast likely resulted in extreme
intrusions upon the suspected gunman’s bodily integrity, both before and
after death.
If litigation were to arise, a court using a proper application of the
balancing test should consider the extent of the suspect’s likely pain and the
potential extent of the damage to the suspect’s body. Thus, information on
the possible consequences of the bomb on the suspect’s bodily integrity
should be relevant to determining the reasonableness of the police’s decision
to kill the suspect using a bomb.109
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CONCLUSION
Police officials in Dallas on July 7, 2016, took a novel approach when
faced with an armed and dangerous suspect. Officers incapacitated him by
blowing him up with a significant amount of explosives. Legal experts and
the media have generally ignored the extraordinary form and extreme
magnitude of the lethal force used to kill the suspect. However, it should not
be presumed that the level of force used by the police was constitutional just
because the Dallas police probably could have killed the suspect in some
manner without violating the Constitution. Excessive force cases, including
those involving lethal force, are judged under the Fourth Amendment using
a balancing test that requires courts to consider the form and quantum of the
force used. It is at least arguable that the form and quantum of force used in
Dallas on July 7, 2016, was unreasonable in light of the extreme injuries the
blast could predictably have inflicted on the suspect’s body in the location in
which he was sequestered.

of the deceased filed a civil suit claiming that the actions of the Philadelphia police during the standoff
constituted excessive force. Africa, 938 F. Supp. at 1280. A jury agreed. Id. at 1281. Nonetheless, the
case on its own is not persuasive support for the proposition that killing a suspect with a bomb violates
the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs had argued several theories in their claim, one of which specifically
focused on the bomb being an unreasonable seizure, and it is unclear which of them the jury found
convincing. Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 910 F. Supp. 212, 216–18 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

171

